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Swann v. Taylor
No. 98-20, 1999 WL 92435
(4th Cir. Feb. 18, 1999)1
I. Facts
On the night of November 7, 1992, Calvin Eugene Swann (Swann")
approached the home of Conway Forrest Richter ("Richter"), in search of
someone to rob for drug money. Swann entered Richter's home masked
and armed with a shotgun. Swanm approached Richter at the dinner table
and told him that "This is a stickup."2 Richter reacted by charging at
Swann. Swann shot him in the chest, killing him. Swann then took sixty
dollars from Richter's wallet. Several weeks later, the police brought Swann
in for questioning upon learning through police investigation that he
disposed of a shotgun sometime after the killing. Swann confessed orally
and in writing to the killing.'
Swann was charged with capital murder in the commission of a rob-
bery while armed with a deadly weapon and robbery. A jury convicted
Swann of both crimes and set his punishment for the robbery at life impris-
onment. During the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial for capital
murder, the jury found the future dangerousness predicate and sentenced
Swann to death.'
Swann's appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United
States Supreme Court were unsuccessful and state habeas proceedings were
exhausted. Swann's federal habeas corpus petition was denied by the
United States District Court. The district court also denied Swann's motion
to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The United States District Court for the Fourth Circuit
granted Swann's application for a certificate of appealability.'
1. This is an unpublished opinion referenced in the "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions" at 173 F.3d 425 (4th Cit. 1999).
2. Swam v. Taylor, No. 98-20, 1999 WL 92435, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 1999).
3. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the facts underlying Swann's conviction, see
Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1994).
4. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *1. Specifically, the jury found a probability that Swam
.would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat
to society." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
5. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *1-2.
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II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions the decision of the
district court.6 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Swann's claims (1)
that he was entitled to a psychiatrist under Ake v. Oklahoma,7 (2) that jury
misconduct denied Swann his right to trial by an impartial jury and the
failure too'bject to these jury deficiencies rendered his counsel constitution-
ally ineffective, and (3) that the jury's viewing of the crime scene denied his
right to a fair trial! The Fourth Circuit vacated the denial of Swann's claim
that he was not competent to be executed9 based on Ford v. Wainwright.'o
The court remanded the claim to the district court with instructions to
dismiss it withoutprejudice, thus allowing Swann to raise it once his death
became imminent.
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Ake v. Oklahoma
Swann appealed the denial of his reqIuest under Ake for a psychiatrist
to evaluate him and assist in his defense. During trial, the court granted
Swann's motion for a mental health expert, pursuant to section 19.2-
264.3:1(E) ("3:1") of the Virginia Code by appointing Dr. Stanton E.
Samenow, a clinical forensic psychologist.' 3 Dr. Samenow evaluated Swann
6. Id., at *19.
7. 470 U.S. 68,83-84 (1985) (holding that when an indigent criminal defendant's sanity
at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, or when a capital defen-
dant's future dangerousness is to be a significant factor at the penalty phase of the trial, a state
must assure the defendant's access to a competent psychiatrist to assist in his defense per the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *9-16. The court's disposition of Swann's claim based
on his right to an impartial jury is briefly discussed within this footnote. Swanm claimed that
the jury's viewing of the crime scene denied him his rights (1) to a fair trial because jurors
noticed his leg shackles and (2) to effective counsel because his trial counsel did not object to
these viewing conditions at that time. The court did not find Swann's claim barred by
section 2254(e) of the United States Code, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA"). Pub. L. No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28
U.S.C. Title 153). The court did find Swarm to have procedurally defaulted the fair trial
claim per Virginia's procedural rules since he presented the claims for the first time in his
state habeas petition. Swann's effectiveness of counsel claim was regarded by the Supreme
Court of Virginia to have no merit and was further found by the Fourth Circuit to be barred
from a new evidentiary hearing per section 2254(d). Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *14-15.
9. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *19.
10. 477 U.S. 399,410 (1986) (recognizing that a state is constitutionally prohibited from
inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane).
.11. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *18-19.
12. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
13. Swann, 1999 WI. 92435, at *2.
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and wrote a report attesting to Swann's sanity at the time of the shooting
as well as his competency to stand trial."'
Swann then advised the court that, if he were found guilty of capital
murder, he intended to use mental expert testimony at the penalty* phase of
his trial."5 In response to this, the Commonwealth moved successfully for
the appointment of Dr. Arthur Centor, a clinical forensic psychologist, to
conduct an evaluation of Swann. 6 Dr. Centor found no symptoms of
mental illness.17 Shortly thereafter, Swann moved for the appointment of
a second mental health expert under 3:1, specifically asking for the appoint-
ment of a psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of evidence relating to the
effect of medication on Swann's mental condition." Swann based his
motion partly upon a letter written by Dr. Samenow in which he stated
that he was unqualified to proffer expert testimony on such medicinal
treatment. 9 Swann further noted that Dr. Ryans, a psychiatrist who had
treated him in the past, was willing to evaluate Swann pursuant to his
second 3:1 request." The trial court denied this second motion, finding the
appointment of Dr. Samenow sufficient to satisfy 3:1.21
Nevertheless, Dr. Ryans did testify at the penalty phase that Swann
suffered from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and that he had
responded well to medication in the past." Swann claimed that the court's
failure to appoint a psychiatrist violated Ake.2" Swann argued that, either
literally or as applied, Ake entitled him to the appointment of a psychiatrist
rather than a psychologist.24 The court, finding that the appointment of Dr.
14. Id. Note that Samenow is a co-author of a study which concludes that neither
mental illness nor environmental factors cause people to commit crimes. The study espouses
the hypothesis that criminals commit crimes because they believe they will not be caught.
See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Jason J. Solomon, Case Note,
11 CAP. DEF. J. 185 (1998) (analyzing Wright, 151 F.3d 151). Defense counsel should suggest
the use of a different, qualified expert when making a 3:1 motion.
15. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *2.
16. Id. The Commonwealth was entitled to the appointment of Centor because once
defense counsel decides to have an appointed expert testify at trial, 3:1 entitles the Common-
wealth to receive the report prepared by the expert for defense counsel; it also permits the
Commonwealth to have an examination of the defendant performed by its own court-
appointed expert. VA. CODE. ANN. S 19.2 - 264.3:1(D) (Michie 1998).
17. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *2.
18. Id., at *3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id., at *3.
22. Id., at *34.
23. Id., at *6.
24. Id., at *4-6. In analysis of this claim, the Fourth Circuit first noted that since Swann
raised the issue on direct appeal, the court was not barred from hearing the claim on review
in federal habeas merely because it had not been raised at the state habeas proceeding. Next,
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Samenow satisfied the Commonwealth's constitutional obligation under
Ake, rejected Swann's argument."5
Swann's attorney deserves applause for his efforts in arguing this point.
The recognition that 3:1 as written does not set a limit on the number of
mental health experts that may be appointed was astute. Further, the
attorney realized that a psychologist was not the proper expert to assist the
defense in understanding the effects of medicinal treatments on aberrant
behavior. This claim was made manifest by Dr. Samenow's letter and it is.
a plausible argument when the circumstances of the case involve medicinal
treatment. Knowledgeable testimony about the effectiveness of medicinal
treatments is especially important when future dangerousness is at issue.
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the issue of expert assis-
tance in preparation of a defense in Caldwell v. Mississippi.26 In Caldwell, the
Court rejected the petitioner's argument that he was denied experts neces-
sary to an adequate defense. 2 However, the Court did not reject the notion
that a defendant's due process rights, upon a showing of particularized need,
require the appointment of expert assistance beyond the mental health
experts provided for under Ake. In Husske v. Commonwealth,8 the Supreme
Court of Virginia interpreted Ake and Caldwell to require appointment of
non-psychiatric expert witnesses if the defendant can show that the assis-
tance requested will probably be a significant factor in his defense and that
the lack of such assistance would prejudice his case.29  Thus, although
counsel in this case was correct to move under rule 3:1 for a psychiatric
expert, the Ake-Caldwell-Husske combination may provide a stronger basis
for appointment of experts beyond mental health experts.
the court considered the effect of AEDPA on Swann's Ake claim. Id., at *4. If a federal claim
has been adjudicated on the merits in the state court, federal habeas relief is prohibited unless
the adjudication's resulting decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.A. S 2254(d)(1),(2) (West 1994
& Supp. 1998). The court agreed with Swann that this issue was not adjudicated on the merits
at the state court level since the claim was decided under state law without reference to or
reliance on federal precedent. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *5.
25. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *6. The court relied on Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396,
401 (4th Cir. 1998), for the premise that appointment of a competent psychologist satisfies
a state's constitutional obligation. See also Anne Duprey, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 175
(1998) (analyzing Wilson, 155 F.3d 396).
26. 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (denying appointment of a criminal investigator, a
fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert to assist in defense preparation due to the lack of
showing of reasonableness of the requests).
27. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 & n.1 (1985).
28. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996) (reading Ake and Caldwell together to show defendant's
entitlement to non-psychiatric experts).




Swann claimed that juror misconduct infringed upon his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to trial by an impartial jury." Swann alleged
the following errors: (1) failure to disclose that one of the jurors worked at
a store that was robbed by Swann; (2) failure to disclose that one of the
jurors was on the jury that convicted Ter Williams, who had committed
a robbery with Swann, of capital murder;and (3) improper consideration
by the jury of Swann's parole eligibility if he were sentenced to life impris-
32onment. Upon review of these claims under the standards set forth in 28
U.S.C. S 2254(d) and 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e), as amended by AEDPA, the court
found Swann barred from arguing these claims and that, even if the claims
had merit, they would amount to harmless error."
The court's analysis of this argument shows the importance of coun-
sel's actions at the trial level in selecting an impartial jury. During voir dire,
prospective jurors should be questioned as to their prior service, if any, on
other capital juries. Another important question is whether they have
served on juries in noncapital trials of the defendant's friends or acquain-
tances. The concern is that, by allowing jurors that have served on juries
in either of these situations to sit on a defendant's capital jury, a connection
may be made between the two defendants. Even though separated by time
and guilt, the juror may transfer the guilt of the first defendant to the
defendant in the current case. This transfer is particularly dangerous in
cases in which the Commonwealth attempts to prove future dangerousness,
because the connection might be made through testimony regarding prior
criminal acts. These matters must be addressed at voir dire because if they
are recognized and litigated later in the process, they will likely be treated
as harmless error.
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Swann claimed that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated by his trial counsel's failure to question prospective jurors on prior
jury service or to object to the admission into evidence of Terry Williams's
30. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *9.
31. Id. Note also that the juror who sat on the Terry Williams jury was not the only
one present from those proceedings. The judge and prosecutor from the Williams case were
the judge and prosecutor in Swann's case. Id.
32. Id., at *10. A juror apparently had wanted to vote for life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. The trial court instructed the jurors that this verdict was not an
option. Id. This case was tried prior to Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994),
which held that where future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits parole for
capital life imprisonment sentences, as is true in Virginia, due process requires that the jury
be informed of parole ineligibility.
33. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *12.
1999)
SWANN V TAYLOR
death sentence.' The court analyzed these claims under Strickland v.
Washington" which held that a defendant must prove that counsel's perfor-
mance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this
performance was prejudicial to the outcome of the trial in order to succeed
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?6 The court, relying on Wil-
liams v. Taylor,37 concluded that the Supreme Court had clarified the preju-
dice prong of Strickland in Lockhart v. Fretwell.' The Lockhart Court held
that an ineffectiveness claimant would need to show that the result of his
trial was "fundamentally unfair or unreliable" for the claim to succeed.?
Since Swann could not convince the court that his case was prejudiced, his
claim failed.'
While failing to identify and strike veniremen during voir dire who
have convicted a defendant's friends of capital murder may not rise to the
level of ineffective assistance of counsel, it should nevertheless be avoided
because of the possible transfer of guilt to the defendant in the second trial.
D. Ford v. Wainwright
Swann claimed that, under Ford v. Wainwright, his execution would
violate his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because of his mental
condition.41 Swann first raised this issue before the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which held the claim to be procedurally defaulted. 2 Swann argued
before the Fourth Circuit that this decision was in error under recent
United States Supreme Court decision Stewart v. Martinez- Villareal,43 which
34. Id.
35. 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (setting forth two-prong test to be employed in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims).
36. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *13-14.
37. 163 F.3d 860, 869 (4th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the prejudice standard announced
by the Court in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), was a clarification of Strickland).
38. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
39. Id. at 369. Note that this interpretation of Lockhart as a clarification of Strickland
is controversial. In her concurring opinion in Lockhart, Justice O'Connor expressed the
concern that this "clarification" interpretation would result from the Court's decision, and
stated that Lockhart should have "no effect on the prejudice inquiry under Strickland...."
Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 373 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For further discussion of why Lockbart
may be an improper clarification of Strickland, see Jason J. Solomon, Case Note, 11 CAP.
DEF. J. 367 (1999) (analyzing Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874 (4th Cir. 1998)); Alix M. Karl,
Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 169 (1998) (analyzing Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203 (4th Cir.
1998)).
40. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *16. Note that the court looked only to the prejudice
prong of Strickland and did not claim that the conduct fell below objective reasonableness.
Id., at *13.
41. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *I&
42. Id., at *17.
43. 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1622 (1998) (stating that a Ford claim is not ripe until death is
[ Vol. 12:1
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was decided after the Supreme Court of Virginia adjudicated Swann's
claim." The Martinez- Villareal Court held that a Ford claim does not ripen
for resolution until execution is imminent because only then can an indi-
vidual's competency to be executed be properly assessed.45 The Fourth
Circuit remanded Swann's claim to the state court with instructions to
dismiss without prejudice so that he might properly raise it at the appropri-
ate time after his other remedies have been exhausted.'
It is unclear what Swann argued on remand to convince the court that
he was not competent to be executed. Presumably, Swan would have been
required to demonstrate that the logic of Ford precludes the execution, of
defendants who, although not legally insane, nevertheless suffer from severe
mental illness. The United States Supreme Court in Ford basing its decision
on history, tradition, and the Eighth Amendment, concluded that states are
prohibited from inflicting the death penalty on prisoners who are insane.47
Because the bases for this conclusion are largely moral and historical, they
seem to apply equally to the severely mentally ill: if someone is severely
mentally ill, he, like the insane, may well be prevented from "comprehend-
ing the reasons for the penalty or its implications."41 Although the Court
gave the states ultimate responsibility for enforcement, some evidentiary
hearing is indisputably appropriate. Further, the Court showed willingness
to strike down procedures which it finds constitutionally deficient, which
should encourage defense counsel to file motions which challenge inade-
quate procedures like those found in this case. Swann's argument on
remand did not convince the Virginia court that he was not competent to
be executed and, subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied
granting certiorari on this issue.49
IV Epilogue
On Wednesday, May 12, 1999, about four hours before his scheduled
execution, Governor James S. Gilmore granted Swann clemency by com-
muting his sentence to life imprisonment without parole due to his severe
mental impairment.' There was a strong and highly documented basis for
Governor Gilmore's decision to commute the sentence. Swann had, in his
imminent).
44. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *16-17.
45. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1622 (1998).
46. Swann, 1999 WL 92435, at *18.
47. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
48. Id. at 417.
49. Swann v. Taylor, 119 S.Ct. 1591 (1999).
50. See Frank Green, Gilmore Grants Swann Clemency Sentence Commuted to L fe
Without Parole, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 13, 1999, at Al; Calvin Swtann Gilmore
Gives Life, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, May 14, 1999, at B10.
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twenty-five year history of mental illness, been diagnosed as having schizo-
phrenia at least forty-one times, been described as psychotic at least thirty-
one times, been declared incompetent to stand trial twice, been involun-
tarily committed to mental hospitals at least sixteen times, been regularly
medicated with eight different antipsychotic drugs, and received Social
Security payments because of his illness. This was the sixth time clemency
has been granted a death row inmate in Virginia and the fortieth time in the
United States since the death penalty was reinstated by the United States
Supreme Court in 1976.)
Kimberly A. Orem
51. Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About Clemency,
< http://www.essential.org/orgs/dpic/demency.html >.
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